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The	WTO’s	unfinished	business
The	ongoing	international	trade	tensions	between	the	US	and	a	host	of	countries	serves	as	a	reminder	of	the
importance	of	strong	international	institutions	in	helping	avoid	the	escalation	of	trade	disagreements	into	trade	wars.
The	WTO	and	its	predecessor	the	GATT	are	often	seen	as	not	only	a	strong	force	behind	multilateral	trade
liberalisation,	but	also	a	place	where	governments	can	cooperate	in	order	to	set	tariffs	and	resolve	disputes	in	a
mutually	beneficial	manner.	But	exactly	how	much	do	countries	cooperate	within	the	WTO	framework?
We	address	this	question	in	a	new	study	where	we	examine	the	extent	to	which	tariffs	set	by	WTO	members	(before
the	recent	trade	frictions)	reflect	cooperative	behaviour.	Tariff	negotiations	are	considered	the	bread	and	butter	of	the
WTO	and,	therefore,	if	there	is	one	area	in	which	cooperation	should	be	observed,	it	is	definitely	in	the	area	of	tariffs.
Surprisingly,	we	found	that	more	than	three-quarters	of	tariffs	applied	by	WTO	members	do	not	reflect	any	type	of
cooperation.	This	matters	because	we	estimate	that	a	move	from	non-cooperation	to	cooperation	leads	on	average
to	a	35	percentage	points	reduction	in	tariffs	for	products	in	which	importers	have	significant	market	power	in	world
markets.	Note	that	35	percentage	points	is	roughly	the	average	reduction	in	tariffs	observed	among	high-income
countries	since	the	creation	of	the	GATT.	This	is	consistent	with	our	finding	that	most	high-income	countries	tend	to
set	their	tariffs	cooperatively	within	the	WTO	system.
Much	less	cooperation	is	observed	among	middle-	and	low-income	countries.	Most	of	their	tariffs	are	set	non-
cooperatively.	One	may	think	that	this	is	a	minor	problem.	Indeed,	most	middle-	and	low-income	countries	tend	to	be
small,	and	therefore	have	little	market	power	in	world	markets.	There	is	no	need	to	negotiate	with	these	countries
because	they	have	little	impact	on	world	markets.	This	reasoning	is	incorrect	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	if
individual	countries	have	little	market	power,	collectively	they	obviously	matter	and	can	significantly	affect	world
markets.	Second,	our	estimates	suggest	that	many	middle-	and	low-income	countries	have	strong	market	power	in
world	markets	by	themselves.	Brazil	and	China	are	obvious	examples.	But	even	countries	such	as	Uruguay	or
Burundi	can	have	strong	market	power	in	a	few	items.	Among	the	21,000	tariff	lines	in	the	top	10	per	cent	of	the
distribution	of	market	power	among	WTO	members,	Uruguay	appears	100	times,	and	Burundi	7	times.	And	this
matters	because	according	to	our	estimates,	without	cooperation	in	tariff	setting,	importers	could	be	setting	tariffs	at
levels	higher	than	125	per	cent	if	they	are	at	the	top	10	per	cent	of	the	market	power	distribution.
Thus,	despite	the	success	that	is	often	attributed	to	the	GATT	and	WTO	negotiations	in	terms	of	tariff	reductions,	it
seems	that	there	is	room	for	further	cooperation	in	tariff	setting	among	WTO	members,	particularly	in	the	case	of
middle-	and	low-income	countries.	There	are	some	significant	gains	from	tariff	cooperation	that	are	currently	being
left	on	the	negotiating	table.
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Does	this	limited	degree	of	cooperation	mean	that	the	WTO	and	GATT	have	not	been	very	useful?	Does	it	imply	that
the	collapse	of	the	WTO	would	have	little	effect	on	international	trade?	The	answer	to	these	two	questions	is	a	clear
NO.	Even	if	less	than	a	quarter	of	WTO	member	tariff	lines	are	set	cooperatively,	these	are	tariff	lines	imposed	by
relatively	large	countries	covering	a	large	share	of	world	trade.	Our	estimates	suggests	that	if	all	tariffs	lines	that	are
currently	set	cooperatively	were	to	be	set	non-cooperatively,	as	might	be	observed	during	a	full-blown	trade	war,	then
the	simple	average	tariff	in	the	United	States	would	increase	by	39	percentage	points,	and	in	the	EU	by	51
percentage	points.
Depending	on	the	export	bundle	of	each	country,	as	well	as	its	trading	partners,	such	a	move	towards	a	full-blown
trade	war	can	lead	to	very	large	increases	in	the	tariffs	exporters	face	in	world	markets.	We	estimate	an	increase	in
tariffs	faced	by	the	average	world	exporters	of	32	percentage	points.	Today	the	average	tariff	in	the	world	is	5	per
cent.	Getting	rid	of	the	WTO	would	therefore	imply	a	six-fold	increase	in	the	average	tariff	faced	by	exporters.	And
some	countries	could	face	much	larger	increases.	Haiti	exporters,	for	example,	would	experience	an	increase	in	the
average	tariff	they	face	in	world	markets	of	around	85	percentage	points.	Honduras	and	Mexico	exporters	would
experience	average	tariff	increases	abroad	in	the	order	of	60	percentage	points.	The	economic	and	social
consequences	of	such	increases	in	tariffs	faced	abroad	can	be	very	important.
A	well-functioning	WTO	helps	prevent	such	scenarios.	There	is	clearly	comfort	in	what	has	been	achieved	so	far,	but
the	WTO	also	needs	to	be	looking	into	what	remains	to	be	done.	To	move	forward	there	is	no	need	to	move	into
nontraditional	WTO	areas	such	as	labour,	environment,	investment	or	competition.	There	is	still	a	lot	to	be	done	in
terms	of	simple	tariff	cooperation	in	the	case	of	low-	and	middle-income	countries.	Reducing	negotiating	costs	faced
by	those	WTO	members	at	the	multilateral	level	would	definitely	help	to	bring	them	to	the	negotiating	table.	Less
discretion	in	negotiation	and	more	negotiating	rules,	even	if	sophisticated,	can	be	one	avenue	to	explore.
♣♣♣
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